Drones have changed warfare on the battlefield and beyond. At present there are more drones than practical countermeasures, although that could possibly change in future.
The preponderance of battlefield drones removes the shooter from the battlefield, preserving manpower, enhances target accuracy well beyond almost any other tool and subjects traditional hardware, especially armor, to effective interdiction and immobilization if not outright destruction.
Ukraine has the most advanced drone operations program today, followed by Russia, with the US and China far behind. Experts believe warfare has changed irrevocably, with the drone in the forefront of tactical battlefield changes. That is why Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth on June 10th called for a program called “Unleashing America’s Drone Dominance.”
He foresaw a three-point program, first, to bolster US drone manufacturing.
Second, Hegseth looked for a technological leapfrog to arm US combat units with a variety of low-cost drones.
Third, he wanted to improve training for the US military “as we expect to fight in future.”
Hegseth’s overall proposal, however, did not reform any sector sufficiently to obtain the end result he hoped to achieve. To do that, the US would need to adopt either the Ukrainian or the Russian approach to supporting drone operations from the factory to the battlefield.
Both the Ukrainian model and the Russian one share some noteworthy similarities:
Both aim at an efficient logistics system to deliver weapons to the battlefield where they are needed,
Both set up administrative systems to provide tactical information and set up feedback loops to continually adjust both tactics and product performance.
Both offer specialized training focused on different drone types, such as FPV drones, unique drones like the Russian Lancet, and methods of intercepting drones.
Both experiment aggressively with new tools to move forward with literally anything that works, as rapidly as possible.
Hegseth’s focus on efficient procurement is a correct step to “cut red tape” and start up production of “inexpensive” drones for the battlespace. Hegseth does not, however, focus on measuring results or feedback loops. Thus, once a product is in serial production, there is no clear mechanism to make product changes to either hardware or software. Likewise, there is no quick way to adjust operations and tactics, at least so far.
The US does improve weapons, but the system is slow. Drone warfare is rapidly evolving, and changes in hardware, software and tactics can change in days. Any drone manufacturing system needs the flexibility to change quickly and commanders need to be able to order changes without taking years to “convince” the procurement folks of the need and urgency.
Ukraine has been immensely successful in drone manufacturing, often channeling the work to small workshops, or to companies that previously built commercial items. According to the Russians, they recently attacked the Flex (previously Flextronics) plant in Mukachevo, western Ukraine, noteworthy for manufacturing coffeemakers, because it was allegedly making electronic assemblies for Ukrainian drones. Supporting the Russian claim, at least indirectly, is the fact that Russia used two expensive Iskander missiles to destroy large parts of the facility.
Russia has either repurposed factories or set up new ones to meet the expanding need for drones for the war in Ukraine. One of the most impressive is a greenfield factory run by civilians at Yelabuga, Tatarstan. It mass-manufactures Geran-2 drones, based originally on Iran’s Shahed 136 but with many local changes and improvements.
Both Russia and Ukraine are importing many of the components needed for drone production, especially small drones that rely on cheap circuit boards and cameras and low cost controllers, batteries and electric motors. Ukraine gets parts from Europe, the US and Asia (including China). Russia, too, uses electronics and hardware from Asia and Europe.
The Pentagon seems to be going in a different direction emphasizing US manufacturing covering the entire supply chain. While it is possible the Defense Department can underwrite the costs associated with start up production of drone components, it is an expensive undertaking and it is hard to see why it is necessary.
A better approach would be to identify suppliers outside the US that can manufacture key components competitively and rapidly, focusing US drone makers on innovations and flexibility to determine the best components at affordable prices.
Hegseth clearly wants to avoid the “gold plating” inherent in much Pentagon procurement, a praiseworthy objective. He also needs to convince those in the present-day supply chain to focus on economy and cost, while assuring that safety and reliability are inherent in products that are accepted for service.
Traditionally, the Pentagon gets high marks on safety, fair marks on reliability, and bad marks on pricing. (Obviously when you move up the ladder of sophistication, testing becomes more elaborate and reliability and safety are more difficult to achieve.)
Unlike the US military, Ukraine has a supervisory organization, which it stood up in the summer of 2024, called the Unmanned Systems Forces (Сили безпілотних систем, СБС).
Ukraine was the first country to create such an organization with responsibility for drone warfare for all military services. The Ukrainian Unmanned Forces is headed by Colonel Vadym Sukharevsky, who is a deputy to Ukraine’s Commander in Chief Oleksandr Syrskyi.
Sukharevsky is a highly decorated and experienced combat veteran. Sukharevsky is supported by Colonel Andriy Lebedenko – his focus is on innovation, specifically the technology component of the army and combat systems.This past July General Syrskyi claimed that Ukraine had hit over 24,000 targets with drones. Beyond attacks on the battlefield, Ukraine has stepped up deep-strike operations against Russian assets across the border in Russia.
What is special about the Ukrainian setup is that drone operations are at the very top of Ukraine’s military operations, and decisions on their use along with training, support and logistics are coordinated with overall battle planning and with overall Ukrainian policies, such as deep strikes on Russia or attacking a pipeline system on Russian territory that sends oil to Hungary.
The Russian system was set up last July at the direction of Russia’s Defense Minister, Andrei Belousov.
It is called the Rubikon Center for Advanced Unmanned Technology. Rubikon supplies specialized detachments to the Russian armed forces. In addition Rubikon trains operators and instructors from other units and works on research and development in cooperation with Russian developers.
Rubikon invites competition across Russia and tests and evaluates new products, supporting testing and demonstrations. It also has command posts in the army and elsewhere (most recently in the navy), where new products can be tried out. It’s likely that Rubikon is also responsible for setting up tracking systems to evaluate drone effectiveness and supports means of feeding back new information on drone performance, counter-drone performance and enemy tactics and techniques.
Unlike Ukraine, Rubikon seems to operate semi-independently from established command channels. At least for its command units, it arranges supply channels and support for its warfighters. It isn’t clear how Rubikon works with regular units in the army, air force and navy.
The US does not yet have a national warfighting approach for drones. The Marines have put together a small drone and counter-drone handbook, and there is much experimentation underway for drone use on the battlefield and testing of counter-drone technology. Training courses are now becoming available for operators.
In the US many questions still are lacking answers, such as how drones can be integrated with regular combat operations, how to run drones using radio frequencies that don’t conflict with command and control and other weapons, how to defend against enemy drones and what the best training methods are that can educate up and down the chain from operator to commander and vice versa.
Meanwhile, the manufacturing of “cheap drones” still is unsettled.
It would make sense to emulate the Ukrainian model and put senior drone coordinators and commanders in each service and on the Joint Staff.
Should US forces get into ground fighting in Europe, or in Korea, coordinating the use of drones and countering enemy drones would quickly become a major issue unless greater progress had been made in assuring that US forces were prepared and properly supported to deal with drone-defined warfare.
The US also needs to think about drone defense for its allies around the world. At present the US cannot claim it is ready to provide significant support because US forces are not ready now.
While Secretary Hegseth may not like the challenge, he needs to drive the military services and the chiefs to consider drone warfighting as a critical challenge, and make changes in leadership commensurate with modern warfighting conditions.
Stephen Bryen is a special correspondent to Asia Times and former US deputy undersecretary of defense for policy. This article, which originally appeared in his Substack newsletter Weapons and Strategy, is republished with permission.
