China’s revelation of a J-16’s near-miss with foreign stealth jets has highlighted the intensifying race for air dominance in the Pacific—one defined less by combat encounters than by who can field, fund and sustain the future of airpower.
This month, the South China Morning Post (SCMP) reported that China has revealed a previously undisclosed aerial confrontation in 2024 involving a domestically produced J-16 fighter jet and two unidentified foreign stealth aircraft near its coastal waters, according to state broadcaster CCTV.
The incident, recounted by People’s Liberation Army (PLA) pilot Li Chao of the Western Theatre Command, happened during a routine training exercise when the foreign jets approached Chinese airspace with what Li described as “clear intentions of intersecting and provoking.”
In response, Li executed a series of aggressive maneuvers, including a barrel roll and inverted flight within 10 to 15 meters of one jet, before locking onto both aircraft simultaneously using the J-16’s targeting system. The foreign jets subsequently withdrew, and no similar aircraft have reappeared in the area since, CCTV noted.
The Western Theater Command oversees sensitive border zones, including Xinjiang and Tibet. The disclosure comes amid China’s ongoing modernization of its air fleet, replacing aging J-7s with advanced J-10C and J-16 multirole fighters. The J-16’s capabilities are viewed by analysts as critical for deep-strike missions and the neutralization of strategic assets.
The episode reflects the growing intersection of technology, training and readiness that now defines airpower competition.
Chinese analysts have focused particularly on the US-made F-35, with SCMP mentioning an April 2023 study in the peer-reviewed Modern Defense Technology journal, which says the F-35 is likely a greater threat than the older F-22, having more advanced avionics and multirole capabilities, compared to the latter, which is optimized for air superiority.
A possible encounter between J-16s and F-35s raises the question of how 4th-generation fighters would perform against 5th-generation aircraft. Justin Bronk points out in an October 2020 Royal United Services Institute (RUSI) report that 4th-generation fighters, such as the J-16, have several disadvantages against 5th-generation platforms, like the F-35.
According to Bronk, the main issue is radar visibility—4th-generation fighters have large radar cross sections and depend on active radar emissions, making them easier to detect and track.
He adds that 4th-generation fighters lack low-probability-of-intercept/detection (LPI/LPD) features and stealth shaping, reducing survivability in contested environments. Additionally, he notes that sensors and electronic warfare suites are less integrated, limiting situational awareness. Bronk also states that external weapons and fuel tanks negatively impact aerodynamic performance and stealth profiles.
Despite the hype surrounding 5th and 6th-generation fighters, 4th-generation fighters remain the backbone of contemporary airpower. Paul Kennard points out in a June 2025 article for European Security and Defense (ESD) that, despite lacking stealth and supercruise, the type remains highly competitive due to cost-efficiency, payload flexibility and operational resilience.
Kennard adds that the type integrates cutting-edge sensors, digital backbones, and advanced weapons, with their rugged designs supporting austere basing and high sortie rates, critical in peer conflicts where quantity and adaptability matter. He points out that their lower maintenance burden and broader availability make them indispensable for sustained operations, realistic training and strategic depth.
In terms of 5th-generation fighter force numbers, China may already have 300 J-20s, with its J-35 having entered limited series production. However, those numbers pale in comparison with the US stealth fighter fleet, with 187 F-22s and 630 F-35s across all services as of May 2024.
However, the stealth fighter count may not be telling the whole story. In a September 2025 Mitchell Institute for Aerospace Studies report, John Venable and Joshua Baker mention that the US Air Force now fields just 1,386 fighters, of which 750 are combat-coded, marking barely a third of its 1987 Cold War strength. They mention that only 28%, about 388 jets, are 5th-generation F-22s and F-35s, with the latter numbering fewer than 400 aircraft.
Venable and Baker point out that the US Air Force should have had around 800 F-35s by 2020 but procured only 272, reflecting chronic underfunding, production cuts and “divest-to-invest” policies. They add that the fighter fleet’s average age is 26 years and mission-capable rates average just 59%, leaving a force that is smaller, older and less ready than ever before.
As for China, the US Department of Defense’s (DoD) 2024 China Military Power Report mentions that the People’s Liberation Army Air Force (PLAAF) and People’s Liberation Army Naval Air Force (PLANAF) combined have 1,900 fighters, of which 1,300 are 4th-generation aircraft.
While the US maintains an overall advantage over China in terms of 5th-generation fighter numbers, that gap may be steadily narrowing. David Rice points out in a March 2024 article for Air & Space Forces Magazine that while the US may be producing roughly 135 F-35s a year, 60-70 units go to allies and partners, in contrast to China’s possible production of 100 J-20s annually reserved solely for domestic use.
A similar situation exists with pilot training – while the US leads, China is rapidly narrowing the gap. In the same article, Derek Solen estimates that China trains 400 fighter pilots annually, with that number slowly increasing. Although Solen notes this is still far below the US’s 1,350 pilots per year, the US remains short of its target of 1,800 to 2,000 pilots annually.
Explaining the US fighter pilot shortage, Heather Penney mentions in a January 2025 report for the Mitchell Institute for Aerospace Studies that since the Cold War, the US Air Force has lost over half its combat aircraft and training bases due to decades of force reductions, insufficient aircraft to train new pilots and burnout from constant high-tempo deployments.
Penney notes these factors have left the US Air Force short of nearly 2,000 pilots—over 1,000 of them fighter pilots. She points out that the US Air Force lacks both the training capacity to produce new pilots and the aircraft to absorb them.
She adds that high operational tempos and limited advancement opportunities drive experienced pilots to leave active duty, eroding institutional expertise and leadership.
In a separate November 2024 China Aerospace Studies Institute (CASI) report, Solen points out that the PLAAF aims to avoid a pilot shortage by shortening and centralizing training.
He mentions that the PLAAF is streamlining its four-year flight training pipeline to three years through the introduction of the JL-10 advanced trainer, eliminating intermediate training stages and shifting transition training from combat units to academies like Shijiazhuang, Xi’an and Harbin.
These developments may underscore Admiral John Aquilino’s assessment in a March 2024 US Senate hearing, wherein he mentioned that China, now having the world’s largest navy, may soon have the world’s largest air force.
As the US–China rivalry takes to the skies over the Pacific, supremacy will hinge less on the fighters themselves than on the manpower and industry that keep them flying.
