For years, as fighting raged in Yemen, neighbouring Oman strained to keep its profile as a neutral mediator among warring sides. But when UAE-backed separatists swarmed into a Yemeni region on its border, Muscat took sides.
Oman shared intelligence with Saudi Arabia and cooperated on military strikes in late December into early January against the Southern Transitional Council (STC) in Yemen’s al-Mahra region, a western and Arab diplomat based in the Gulf region told Middle East Eye.
A Gulf analyst speaking on condition of anonymity told MEE that Muscat and Riyadh shared intelligence that the UAE-backed STC planned to announce secession in the vein of Somaliland across the Red Sea.
“Oman acted in the shadows,” Ibrahim Jalal, an expert on the Gulf and Arabian Sea security, told MEE. “But as much as Saudi Arabia was impacted by the STC’s adventurism in Hadhramaut, Oman was impacted by the STC’s miscalculated adventurism in al-Mahra,” he said.
The STC’s advance on Yemen’s two most eastern governorates turned into a strategic blunder for the group and its patron, Abu Dhabi. Saudi Arabia’s air force decimated the STC in the open, desert terrain.
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STC leader Aidarous al-Zubaidi fled from Aden to the UAE by way of Somaliland. The Arabian Sea entrepot is now under the control of forces loyal to Yemen’s Presidential Leadership Council (PLC), backed by Saudi Arabia.
Muscat’s response to the Yemen crisis underscores just how far the UAE overreached, analysts say.
“Riyadh and Muscat were thrown closer together as a result of the UAE,” Jalal added.
Oman does not have Riyadh or Abu Dhabi’s oil riches.
Oman is better known for its sophisticated Amouage perfume and white-washed capital, Muscat, whose traditional architecture was preserved thanks to a decree banning skyscrapers issued by the late Sultan Qaboos bin Said al-Said. Omani tourists tend to be backpackers and low-key beachgoers.
Diplomatically, Oman also avoids making a splash.
Oman was neutral during the Gulf War and the Syrian Civil War. During the Obama administration, it mediated nuclear talks between the US and Iran. In fact, just before US President Donald Trump launched his attack on the Islamic Republic in June 2025, Iranian and US officials were scheduled to meet in Muscat.
But Oman’s quiet action in favour of Riyadh amid the Yemen crisis did not surprise those familiar with the country.
Ghosts of Dhofar
Omanis have deep tribal, cultural and economic ties to Yemen’s al-Mahra region. From 1962 to 1975, Oman fought a bloody counter-insurgency against rebels in its mountainous Dhofar region, which sits on the border with Yemen.
The UAE only became an independent state in 1971, but by then, Muscat, the oldest independent Arab state, was struggling to stem the tide of Marxist guerrillas into Dhofar, who received arms and training from the People’s Democratic Republic of Yemen. Today’s Yemen was created by the 1990 unification of the Marxist southern state and the Yemen Arab Republic in the north.
The Dhofar war has faded into obscurity in the West, but was memorialised by leftist writer Sonallah Ibrahim in his 2000 novel, Warde.
Yousuf al-Balushi, chairman of the Muscat Policy Council, Oman’s first think-tank, told MEE that the memory of succession and instability “continues to shape Omani security perceptions”.
In meetings, Omani diplomats publicly and privately stress their opposition to the type of partition in Yemen that the UAE and its allies hoped for.
When Yemen unified, Muscat worked to strengthen its old tribal ties to al-Mahra, a sparsely populated, traditional region that is blanketed by the Rub’ al-Khali, or Empty Quarter, the world’s largest sand desert.
In 1999, Oman established the al-Mazunah free trade zone in Dhofar to bolster economic ties with Mahris.
“Oman’s border fence actually sits to the east of that Free-Trade zone,” Balushi said.
Amid the fighting with the STC, some Arab analysts told MEE that Riyadh asked Muscat to deploy its military across its border fence with Yemen.
Balushi told MEE that the STC’s advance into Mahra and indications that the Emirati-backed group would declare independence were viewed as a national security risk.
“Yemen had been manageable for [Oman],” he said. “[But] when the UAE posed a very imminent risk of secession in southern Yemen, that was a threat…paving the ground for escalation that might have led to a change of [Oman’s] border”.
“Our policy in al-Mahra is consistent. We oppose the deployment of heavy armaments near our border by any force, and we oppose non-Mahris being put in power there. We will only deal with Mahris,” he added.
Jalal told MEE that Oman had “three red lines” in Yemen tied to border security: “[to] halt the UAE’s expansion of influence near its border, prevent the arrival of separatists near its borders and stop Salafists from setting up on its border”.
Saudi Arabia’s military offensive effectively pushed back on all three for Oman, which is why it provided quiet assistance, experts say.
Dangerous rivalry
Saudi Arabia and the UAE are the ones driving what happens next.
Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman and Emirati President Mohammed bin Zayed were once allies. They intervened in Yemen to oust the Iran-aligned Houthis in 2015. The escalation in Yemen crystallised their fallout.
Over the last ten years, the UAE has backed a host of secessionist movements from Somaliland to Libya.
In Sudan, where a brutal war is raging, the UAE is backing the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces against the Sudanese army, backed by Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and Turkey. Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman asked the US to intervene against the UAE in Sudan, MEE was the first to reveal.
Energised by his success in Yemen, many western and Arab diplomats are asking whether Saudi Arabia’s crown prince will continue pushing back against the UAE across the region.
What does that mean for countries like Oman, which have tried to be mediators?
“When Saudi Arabia and the UAE were fully aligned in 2015, that was too risky for Oman’s interests. The region was too polarised,” Balushi said. He said Oman was in a sweet spot when the UAE and Saudi Arabia “confronted each other, but managed their competition” because it “provided an opening for Oman to mediate”, which it does well.
If their rivalry “reverberates outside” the narrow confines of Yemeni politics, it would be “dangerous” for Oman and the wider GCC, he warned.
Rob Geist Pinfold, an expert on international security at King’s College London, told MEE that the flare-up in Yemen left Oman with few options.
“Oman prides itself on being a neutral party, hedging its bets as a mediator. But that strategy was undermined by the STC offensive. Oman had to take sides against the UAE,” Pinfold said.
As Saudi-backed forces consolidate their control over Southern Yemen, Oman’s job will be to maintain that mediator role.
Balushi said that despite its frustration with the UAE, Oman was careful not to cross public lines.
“For example, Qatar put out a statement during the Saudi strikes on the STC saying that ‘Saudi security is Arab security’, Oman was more neutral,” he said.
In a statement released during the height of Saudi strikes in late December, Oman’s foreign ministry called on “the brotherly Yemeni people to reach an understanding on what is best for the future of their country, in a way that consolidates security, stability and peace in the brotherly Republic of Yemen, and maintains the policy of good neighbourliness”.
Oman relies on good ties with its neighbours because it lacks the oil wealth of Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and even Iran. All of which are able to fund local proxies.
While Oman’s security concerns align with Saudi Arabia, Muscat is also economically linked to the UAE. Muscat lies closer to the Emirati port of Jebel Ali than it does to the Omani port of Duqm.
Omani diplomats are proud of Muscat’s balancing act.
Opening for mediation?
In addition to mediating between the US and Iran, Oman has also served as a mediator between the US, Gulf states and the Houthis.
Oman’s foreign minister took credit in May for mediating a “ceasefire” between the US and Houthis in the Red Sea.
In September, when Israel attacked Hamas negotiators in Doha, Qatar, some speculated whether an Israeli hit on the Houthis could happen in Oman. Last year, a US lawmaker called on Muscat to close a “Houthi office”, using similar language that has been used by lawmakers critical of Qatar.
“Of course, the thought crossed our minds, but if you notice, while the Israeli press regularly attacks Qatar, which is also a mediator, Oman is not criticised the same way,” an Omani diplomat told MEE.
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Pinfold told MEE that the UAE is unlikely to take its frustration out on Oman over Yemen.
“The economic links with Oman come through Dubai, not Abu Dhabi, which is also less involved in Yemen foreign policy. I suspect the economic ties will endure. The Gulf states are ruthlessly pragmatic when it comes to their economies,” he said.
Some analysts actually believe there is a new opening for Omani mediation in Yemen now. The STC is degraded, and Saudi Arabia’s lighting offensive has also helped it regain prestige militarily after its debacle against the Houthis – and diplomatically among Arabs who are opposed to secessionist movements.
Saudi Arabia and the Houthis were already in serious talks. Riyadh has moved to accommodation with the group as it focuses on economic projects. In May, it was Saudi Arabia that lobbied Trump to stop attacking the group. Oman had successfully mediated a prisoner swap between Saudi Arabia and the Houthis in December.
“Oman now has a big opportunity to conclude our mediation,” Balushi said.
The challenge for Omani mediation is now the US and Israel, he said. If the two move to attack Iran again, it could reignite tensions.
“Why should the Houthis make a deal if they don’t get US sanctions relief and are still being bombed by Israel,” he said.
