China is using crystals to enhance the power of satellite-destroying lasers in a daring attempt to blind US satellites and gain strategic superiority in space warfare. This month, the South China Morning Post (SCMP) reported that Chinese scientists have revealed the world’s largest barium gallium selenide (BGSe) crystal.
The 60-millimeter-diameter synthetic crystal, developed by a team led by Professor Wu Haixin at the Hefei Institutes of Physical Science, can reputedly convert short-wave infrared into long-range mid- to far-infrared beams while withstanding laser intensities of up to 550 megawatts per square centimeter. That’s an order of magnitude greater than current military-grade crystals.
The milestone addresses a long-standing challenge in laser weaponry: self-inflicted damage caused by high-power output, which was notably demonstrated by the US Navy’s unsuccessful 1997 MIRACL satellite test.
First discovered in 2010, BGSe initially stunned global researchers but proved difficult to scale outside China. Wu’s team achieved success through meticulous manufacturing—vacuum-sealing ultra-pure materials, month-long crystal growth in dual-zone furnaces, defect-eliminating annealing and precision polishing.
The effort aligns with China’s accelerated pursuit of laser weapons, driven by strategic concerns over Starlink’s military applications and space-based assets.
While intended for military use, the crystal also holds promise for infrared sensors, missile tracking and medical imaging. Since 2020, the material has been integrated into advanced R&D programs, highlighting China’s growing capabilities in laser warfare and advanced photonic materials.
This development highlights China’s effort to weaken US space dominance across all orbital regimes, pushing a shift toward scalable, deniable, layered counterspace tactics, system confrontation doctrines and non-kinetic warfare. These are enabled by US deterrent gaps marked by ambiguous signaling, reliance on resilience denial and limited punishment options.
China is also investing heavily in operational infrastructure to support these technological advances. Asia Times has previously reported on its secretive Korla and Bohu sites in Xinjiang, which are key parts of its ground-based anti-satellite (ASAT) program aimed at dazzling or disabling foreign satellites to conceal sensitive military assets.
Satellite imagery from BlackSky reveals that Korla hosts large laser systems in retractable-roof hangars that activate when foreign imaging satellites are overhead. The Bohu site reportedly contains fixed and mobile truck-mounted lasers for satellite ranging and dazzling.
US officials have taken notice. General Bradley Saltzman mentioned in an April 2025 US-China Economic and Security Review Commission (USSC) hearing that China’s ground-based lasers are intended to “blind and deafen” US forces by targeting critical space-based intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) assets.
Independent analysts have weighed the operational implications of such a shift. While these systems are currently effective against satellites in Low Earth Orbit (LEO), Chinese research suggests aspirations to extend engagement ranges to Medium Earth Orbit (MEO) and Geosynchronous Earth Orbit (GEO), potentially threatening navigation and communication assets, Victoria Samson and Laetitia Cesari mention in a June 2025 Secure World Foundation (SWF) report.
That ambition is raised in other assessments. Jonas Berge and Henrik Hiim mention in an August 2024 article in the peer-reviewed Journal of Strategic Studies that Chinese analysts see the US Global Positioning System (GPS) and Space-Based Infrared System (SBIRS) as key asymmetric vulnerabilities and potential counterspace targets, but for distinct reasons.
According to Berge and Hiim, GPS, composed of satellites in MEO, underpins US precision warfare and is viewed as ripe for soft-kill attacks—particularly jamming and cyber operations—which are low-risk, rapidly reversible and hard to attribute. In contrast, they say SBIRS satellites in GEO are central to the US nuclear early warning system.
They note that while China seeks the ability to hold SBIRS at risk to ensure its second-strike capability, it acknowledges that attacking it could trigger nuclear escalation.
However, China may face considerable challenges in countering modern space architectures in practice. Howard Wang and other writers mention in a March 2025 RAND report that Chinese military writings acknowledge the “whack-a-mole” dilemma posed by resilient LEO satellite constellations, noting that disabling a proliferated constellation demands neutralizing dozens or hundreds of satellites to achieve the same operational effect as targeting a single high-value system.
Wang and others say that People’s Liberation Army (PLA) analysts advocate a multifaceted counterstrategy combining electronic warfare, cyberattacks and directed-energy weapons such as ground-based lasers. They note that these non-kinetic tools are viewed as scalable, cost-effective and deniable means to degrade satellite function en masse without overt escalation.
According to Wang and others, this integrated approach reflects China’s shift toward more adaptive and asymmetric counterspace operations aimed at overwhelming resilient US space architectures.
The doctrinal logic behind this approach has been thoroughly studied. Mark Cozad and other writers mention in a 2022 RAND report that China’s ground-based ASAT lasers and other such weapons are tools that directly support its doctrines of systems confrontation and systems destruction warfare.
According to Cozad and others, systems confrontation and systems destruction warfare are foundational to China’s military thinking, viewing future conflict as contests between rival operational systems rather than force-on-force engagements.
They mention that systems confrontation emphasizes the interdependence of command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (C4ISR) components, where paralyzing key nodes—particularly space-based ISR—can unravel an adversary’s operational cohesion.
Yet while China appears to be moving aggressively, the US posture may be enabling this momentum. Dennis Rice argues in a 2023 Air University paper that the US faces serious deterrence gaps in space, particularly against China. Rice says that the US’s overemphasis on denial by resilience fails to evoke the fear necessary for deterrence by punishment, weakening its ability to dissuade adversaries.
He notes that ambiguity in US signaling—balancing militarization with restraint—can make it appear risk-averse, especially given its greater reliance on space assets. Such a perceived vulnerability, he says, could incentivize China to strike first. He adds that deterrence by denial alone is insufficient, advocating for a complementary posture that includes credible, observable threats to impose costs.
Other observers of Chinese military space doctrine echo this concern. Kevin Pollpeter and other writers argue in a May 2025 China Aerospace Studies Institute (CASI) report that deterring China from attacking US space assets is increasingly difficult due to the unique characteristics of the space domain and the latter’s strategic worldview of it as a “new commanding height of war.”
Pollpeter and others identify ten key factors that affect deterrence but find that only two—the global military balance and China’s growing dependence on space—favor the US. They note that most other factors, including the offense-dominant nature of space, ambiguous signaling, asymmetric space reliance and weak international norms, undermine effective deterrence.
Overall, these trends suggest that China’s advancements in directed-energy weapons—driven by breakthroughs like the BGSe crystal—are part of a strategic plan rather than isolated successes. If the US doesn’t respond with a stronger, more coordinated deterrent, it could find itself increasingly at a disadvantage in a domain it has long dominated.
