For more than two decades, the South China Sea has been the focal point of competing claims, maritime frictions and delicate diplomacy.
What was once envisioned as a stabilizing framework—the Code of Conduct (CoC)—has itself become a symbol of ASEAN’s struggle to balance sovereignty with pragmatism.
From the time ASEAN and China adopted the Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in 2002, negotiators worked on multiple drafts of a binding code, only to spend 23 years distilling them into a single text.
The question today is no longer whether a draft exists, but whether its contents can meaningfully prevent clashes at sea and mitigate boiling territorial disputes.
Binding or merely declaratory?
The unresolved sticking point remains the legally binding nature of the CoC. If the document ends up as a political declaration, it will be vulnerable to selective compliance and easy to disregard when convenient.
A binding code, by contrast, would oblige all signatories to abide by clearly defined rules, creating predictability in a contested maritime domain.
The distinction may appear technical, but its consequences are profound. Without enforceability, the CoC risks becoming yet another diplomatic gesture, attractive on paper but hollow in practice.
Compounding the issue is the scope of the CoC. Will it apply narrowly to disputed features like reefs and shoals, or will it cover the vast maritime domain within China’s “nine-dash line” claim?
For ASEAN claimant states such as Vietnam, the Philippines and Malaysia, this is no academic matter—it is the difference between protecting sovereign rights or conceding them to great-power bargaining.
Another source of tension lies in freedom of navigation operations (FONOPS). For Washington, the principle is clear: no excessive maritime claims should impede global commerce or military passage.
Yet for Beijing, US FONOPS are intrusive, deliberately provocative maneuvers that challenge its authority in waters it considers its own. Between these poles, ASEAN states find themselves caught in a dilemma.
They need FONOPS to safeguard open sea lanes vital for trade, but they also fear being drawn into the spirals of confrontation between Washington and Beijing.
Here lies the essence of ASEAN’s quandary: ensuring that global rules of navigation remain intact without allowing external powers to militarize its backyard.
Quiescent, strategic diplomacy
Malaysian Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim has rightly urged that ASEAN must pursue what he calls a “quiet order”—diplomacy that is quiescent, not noisy; discreet, not theatrical.
In the South China Sea, loud diplomacy often escalates tensions rather than defuses them. Statements that seek to score political points, or military maneuvers broadcast for maximum publicity, tend to harden positions rather than soften them.
That said, quiescent diplomacy does not mean passivity. It is an active strategy of restraint, dialogue, and behind-the-scenes problem-solving.
It allows for necessary activities—patrols, exercises, even FONOPS—to proceed without becoming political spectacles. It also gives room for China and the United States to engage each other without turning ASEAN waters into stages for their rivalry.
Australia and Japan, both increasingly active in regional security, would do well to adopt this approach. Their interests in open seas and stable trade are legitimate.
But by keeping their activities low-key and non-confrontational, they can reassure ASEAN states that their presence is supportive rather than escalatory.
Reframing military exercises
Traditionally, military exercises at sea have been cast in the language of deterrence. Yet deterrence can easily slide into provocation, especially when it takes place near disputed waters.
ASEAN must therefore find ways to reframe these exercises so that they contribute to security without heightening tensions.
Indonesia offers an instructive model. Its naval exercises often incorporate humanitarian dimensions—disaster relief simulations, search and rescue drills and medical evacuation scenarios.
These activities are not only less confrontational but also deeply relevant in a region prone to typhoons, earthquakes, and tsunamis.
A naval fleet preparing to save lives, rather than just project power, demonstrates tangible value to the public and fosters habits of cooperation even among rival navies.
If ASEAN could institutionalize such humanitarian exercises, it would transform the narrative of naval presence. Exercises would still hone skills and display readiness, but they would also build trust and confidence across divides.
Humanitarian drills provide a rare platform for Chinese, American, and ASEAN naval personnel to interact in non-hostile settings—a confidence-building measure often missing in the security domain.
Great power playground
The South China Sea is more than a theater of rivalry. It is the artery through which one-third of global trade flows.
Energy supplies from the Middle East to Northeast Asia pass through its waters, as do critical components in the global supply chain.
For ASEAN, the stakes are existential. Stability in the South China Sea underpins not just sovereignty but economic survival.
This makes ASEAN centrality not an abstract diplomatic slogan but a structural necessity. Without ASEAN as a convener, the South China Sea risks becoming a playground for external powers.
ASEAN’s role must be to insist on inclusive, rule-based management of disputes while ensuring its member states do not become pawns in a wider geopolitical contest.
The challenge now is to convert these principles into practice. A binding Code of Conduct is the first step, but it must be complemented by habits of quiet diplomacy and humanitarian cooperation.
All sides—including the US, China, Australia and Japan—must recognize that loud, combative postures are counterproductive. Quiet diplomacy does not erase differences, but it prevents those differences from erupting into clashes.
The tragedy of the South China Sea is that a miscalculation—an accidental collision, an overzealous response—could spiral into a wider, devastating conflict. The antidote is not megaphone diplomacy but patient, discreet engagement.
As Anwar has argued, the best order for ASEAN is one that is calm, quiet and unassuming. Behind the quietness lies strength: the ability to channel disputes into dialogue, to manage competition without catastrophe, and to build resilience through cooperation.
Composure at sea
Avoiding more clashes in the South China Sea, like those between China and the Philippines, is not a matter of silencing legitimate concerns but of addressing them with composure.
A legally binding Code of Conduct, paired with discreet diplomacy and humanitarian naval cooperation, offers ASEAN and its partners the best chance of preserving stability.
The world must recognize that the South China Sea is not simply contested territory; it is a shared lifeline. Protecting it requires not bravado but balance through quiet strength.
In the end, it is the art of silence—disciplined, deliberate and purposeful—that may prove to be ASEAN’s most powerful tool in ensuring peace on the open seas.
Phar Kim Beng is professor of ASEAN studies at the International Islamic University of Malaysia and director of the Institute of Internationalization and ASEAN Studies (IINTAS).
