The ceasefire agreement that came into effect last month has revealed the contours of Israel-Arab relations, and the political leverage Arab states hold in Washington.
It also underscored that Israel could not have achieved its military gains in the region, nor carried out the genocide in Gaza, without cooperation and political cover from several Arab states.
Since the outset, these states have sought to extract political and strategic advantages from the devastation.
The Saudi crown prince’s White House visit last week further reflected this strategy.
He succeeded in persuading the US administration to approve the sale of advanced F-35 aircraft to Saudi Arabia without requiring normalisation with Israel.
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His meeting with US President Donald Trump made clear that the region is undergoing a strategic realignment and a power struggle between Israel and the Arab states.
Although the direction of this regional shift remains unclear, Palestinian interests are entirely absent from the equation.
Arab interests
Since the so-called ceasefire took effect, Israel has unsurprisingly continued the policies we witnessed in Lebanon over the past year, following the November 2024 ceasefire with Hezbollah, where it committed more than 3,500 violations, killing over 100 Lebanese civilians and dozens of Hezbollah fighters.
And now, only one month after the Gaza ceasefire – an agreement negotiated in Sharm el-Sheikh between the US and Arab and Muslim states, without Palestinian or Israeli participation – Israel has already carried out hundreds of violations and killed nearly 350 Palestinians.
This chain of events demonstrates the regional restructuring underway.
The primary interest of Arab states since the start of the genocide has been preventing the displacement of Palestinians to their territories
A crucial moment was the Israeli strike on Doha on 9 September, the failed attempt to assassinate Hamas leader Khalil al-Hayya, which signalled to Arab states that Israel is willing to operate inside Arab capitals whenever it deems necessary, even against the advice of its own intelligence agencies.
This clearly demonstrated that Israel is not acting as a rational actor; in reality, the Israeli right means precisely what it says, and its politicians must be taken seriously even when their statements appear delusional.
Once Arab states began to perceive a growing threat, a new kind of international politics emerged in which they began using their leverage to restrain Israel.
This has meant imposing a ceasefire over the Israeli far right’s objections; an American airlift to keep Israel bound to it; and direct US intervention in Israeli politics that takes into account Arab interests.
The primary interest of Arab states since the start of the genocide has been preventing the displacement of Palestinians to their territories, particularly Egypt and Jordan, out of fear of political destabilisation.
At the same time, these states want Israel to confront Iran and its allies without requiring direct Arab involvement or triggering a regional war.
Their level of success is difficult to ignore, especially now, as they exploit the American need for investment and exports to obtain concessions that previously required Israeli approval, such as a civilian nuclear agreement and advanced weaponry.
Palestinians sidelined
The Palestinians, meanwhile, remain entirely excluded from these interest-driven arrangements.
Despite widespread Arab public support for the Palestinian cause, what we are witnessing is the formation of new operating lines for Israel: on the one hand, restrictions on regional escalation; on the other hand, no meaningful intervention regarding Palestinian life.
Just last week, yet another Israeli attempt to forcibly relocate Palestinians was exposed when a plane landed in South Africa carrying dozens of people from Gaza under “mysterious” circumstances, revealing that plans for Palestinian expulsions are still active.
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It has also become evident that the “yellow line” inside Gaza – originally presented as temporary – is becoming a permanent reality, dividing old Gaza from the “new Gaza”.
Parallel to Israel’s growing international constraints, the Israeli right has entered a period of internal turmoil.
It has come to understand that the unprecedented force and violence it exercised over the past two years was ultimately dependent on Arab and American support.
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Without such support, the far right’s aspirations of annexation and population transfer have collided with political reality.
Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, who heads the most extreme government in the country’s history and who has enjoyed broad public support for genocide and displacement, now finds himself constrained by Washington’s intervention.
This has created a crisis within the right, which cannot openly challenge the US, especially with Trump as president and at a time when anti-Israel sentiment is growing among Republicans and Democrats alike.
Compensation for these constraints comes in the form of a free hand in anti-Palestinian legislation and intensified military operations against Palestinians in Gaza, the West Bank and, as we saw this week, inside Lebanon after Israel bombed Ain al-Hilweh refugee camp and southern Beirut.
Not only are Palestinians excluded from international forums discussing Gaza, but the knowledge that Arab states will not act on their behalf creates a new equation: the more Israel is restrained regionally, the more aggressively it acts against Palestinians.
What appears temporary is being consolidated into permanent policy.
Escalation ahead
In last week’s defence budget discussions, the army requested that Israel’s 2026 defence budget remain around 140 billion shekels ($38bn), despite the ceasefire, similar to the 2025 level and roughly $30bn more than the finance ministry’s estimate.
It also requested maintaining a reserve force of 60,000 soldiers, 10 times larger than before the genocide.
All of this is justified by claims of rising threats, particularly in the north, and the need to continue holding the territories captured in Syria, while preparing for further rounds of fighting.
The regional reconfiguration places Israel in an uncomfortable and uncertain position, something Israel neither likes nor easily accepts.
It is unaccustomed to a reality in which its dominance over Arab states is no longer assured, neither in Washington nor on the military level.
From this weakened position, Israel is preparing for a reality in which it will need to use even more force to strengthen its standing in regional negotiations and political bargaining.
Meanwhile, the Arab states, having achieved significant gains, are now attempting to revive the idea of recognising a Palestinian state.
The more Israel is restrained regionally, the more aggressively it acts against Palestinians
Too little, too late.
The entire discussion around statehood recognition, or linking normalisation to a pathway towards it, is devoid of substance.
First, this is no longer possible. Every day, Finance Minister Bezalel Smotrich and Settlement Minister Orit Strock advance policies in the West Bank that create de facto annexation and facts on the ground that will be nearly impossible to reverse.
Second, beyond Arab public opinion, Arab states themselves recognise the magnitude of Israel’s actions over the past two years and the trajectory of events locally and internationally, and they understand that Israel is now preparing for further rounds of conflict.
Once again, contrary to longstanding Arab assumptions, Israel is not a rational actor, and it will not relinquish its aggressive regional posture easily, especially when it comes to Palestinians.
And as long as Arab states continue to operate solely from their narrow interests rather than engage seriously with the future of the Palestinian people, the region will remain unstable and on a path towards further wars.
The views expressed in this article belong to the author and do not necessarily reflect the editorial policy of Middle East Eye.
