By wheeling the Typhon missile system into Japan, the US has planted a mobile, multi-mission spear at China’s doorstep—extending strike range even as its bulky footprint invites satellite surveillance, missile attacks and drone swarms.
This month, multiple media outlets reported that the US Army has deployed its Typhon mid-range missile system to Japan for the first time, unveiling it at Marine Corps Air Station Iwakuni in Yamaguchi Prefecture as part of the two sides’ annual Resolute Dragon joint exercise.
The system, which can fire Tomahawk cruise missiles and Standard Missile-6 (SM-6) interceptors with ranges of up to 1,600 kilometers, enables strikes from Japan on China’s populous and economically vital eastern seaboard as well as parts of Russia.
Its temporary stationing comes amid growing tensions in the Indo-Pacific, with more than 19,000 US and Japanese troops participating in the two-week drill focused on maritime and island defense.
The Typhon deployment follows earlier tests in Australia and stationing in the Philippines, moves that highlight the US’s efforts to counter China’s expanding missile arsenal after the lapse of Cold War-era arms control limits.
Colonel Wade Germann, commander of the US Army’s 3rd Multi-Domain Task Force (MDTF), said Typhon’s mobility and mix of munitions “create dilemmas for the enemy” by allowing rapid forward positioning.
China condemned the move as a threat to regional security, while Russia labeled it destabilizing and accused Japan of militarization. Beijing aired similar complaints when Typhon was deployed to the Philippines.
Although the battery will reportedly be removed from Japan after the exercise, US officials have signaled Typhon’s broader role in bolstering deterrence and long-range precision strike capabilities across the Pacific.
If left in Japan, as the system was after similar drills in the Philippines, Typhon could complement Japan’s nascent counterstrike capabilities.
Japan may be building such capabilities around the Type 12 surface-to-ship missile (SSM), of which it plans to acquire 1,000 units. The Type 12 SSM has a range of 200 kilometers, while upgraded variants aim to extend that range to 900 and eventually 1,200 kilometers.
Aside from producing its own missiles, Japan has purchased 400 US-made Tomahawk cruise missiles to be integrated into its newer destroyers, namely the Maya, Kongo, Atago classes, and soon-to-be-launched Aegis System Equipped Vessels (ASEVs).
A Typhon battery could help to preserve Japan’s shipboard vertical launch system (VLS) cell capacity for ballistic missile defense (BMD), while adding land-attack capabilities.
Its deployment would also partly alleviate the US Navy’s magazine depth problem, adding more missile capacity for prolonged BMD and air defense engagements. Keeping Typhon in Japan would also free up US and Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force (JMSDF) assets for air defense and sea control missions.
More importantly, Typhon relies on the US’s long-range space-based intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) capabilities for targeting, a capability Japan has struggled to develop. Japan’s emerging counterstrike capabilities have notable ISR gaps, which the Typhon can help to address as it works to overcome the long-range shortcomings.
The Typhon in Japan would also help to complete the US’s “missile wall” strategy to contain China. The strategy envisions US and allied long-range missiles stretching from the Ryukyus in Japan, supplemented by Taiwan’s indigenous missile program, with US Typhon and Navy Marine Expeditionary Ship Interdiction System (NMESIS) missile deployments in the Philippines.
However, Typhon’s large footprint, with a battery consisting of four 8×8 launchers, an 8×8 battery operations center (BOC), a 6×6 reload trailer and a BOC support vehicle, poses significant logistical challenges for rapid deployment and survivability. In particular, the system requires large strategic airlifters, such as the US C-17 fleet, which may now be overstretched and vulnerable to long-range air-to-air missiles.
If transported by sea, its deployment might be limited due to the lack of suitable landing areas, including specialized port facilities, roads and bridges strong enough to support it.
These challenges echo earlier experiments with alternative launchers. While the US Marine Corps pioneered the smaller Long-Range Fires (LRF) system — essentially a Tomahawk cruise missile mounted on a remote-controlled ground vehicle — it proved unable to operate in austere environments.
As a result, it was abandoned in favor of the shorter-ranged Navy-Marine Expeditionary Ship Interdiction System (NMESIS), which lacks the Tomahawk’s range and punch or the SM-6’s ballistic missile defense capability.
When deployed, the Typhon’s large footprint could make it easy to locate and destroy. China’s significant space-based ISR capabilities, which in 2024 consisted of 32 geostationary orbit (GEO) and 300 other surveillance satellites, mean it has the capabilities to locate US and allied forces’ assets other than perhaps submarines.
Those ISR capabilities could be used to support a reconnaissance-strike complex against the ponderous Typhon system. In such a scenario, the People’s Liberation Army Rocket Force’s (PLARF) CJ-10 and CJ-100 ground-launched cruise missiles (GLCM) could conduct multi-axis attacks, while the DF-17 medium-range ballistic missile (MRBM), armed with a hypersonic glide vehicle (HGV), penetrates missile defenses.
In addition, China’s drone swarms may pose a problem to Typhon systems deployed in Japan. In a Center for a New American Security (CNAS) report this month, Stacey Pettyjohn and Molly Campbell wargame a Chinese drone swarm attack against US forces stationed at Yonaguni in Japan.
Pettyjohn and Campbell mention that loitering munitions and first-person view (FPV) drones launched from trucks in mainland China, unmanned surface vessels (USVs) and multirotor drone motherships could attack US radars, supply and fuel points, as well as missile transporter erector launchers (TELs) like those used by the Typhon system.
They say that by using inexpensive drones, China possesses a continuous ability to attack US forces from within the First Island Chain, with the maneuverability of FPVs and USVs enabling attacks from multiple directions.
Although they note that China’s drone strikes are unlikely to destroy US forces outright, they could force them to deplete their limited interceptor missile stocks and take a defensive stance, as the scale of China’s drone attacks could outmatch their active defenses.
Pettyjohn and Campbell argue that some drones will inevitably slip past US active air defenses, stressing that US forces need to deploy passive defenses such as jammers and hardened shelters at fixed locations such as airfields.
According to them, a combination of passive and active defenses could mitigate some effects of drone attacks and enable offensive operations, which could include long-range missile strikes against targets deep in mainland China.
By rolling Typhon into Japan, the US may have just added both muscle and vulnerability to its Indo-Pacific arsenal if it stays put. The real test will be whether this missile spear can stay hidden, supplied and lethal under China’s watchful eye.
