The Trump administration made a massive political blunder on August 20th in its pursuit of a peace deal between Russia and Ukraine. The blunder centered on a “virtual” meeting led by NATO.
Prior to that meeting, Trump had promised the Russians that any deal would rule out Ukraine’s NATO membership. Apparently the Russians read Trump’s assurance to include no NATO peacekeepers. That was a mistake.
The administration did not consult with the Russians ahead of the NATO parlay.
The NATO-led meeting was intended to lay out military options to meet Ukraine’s request for security guarantees. The discussion apparently considered different views on what a security guarantee would actually look like: Would it, for example, include troops. If so, how many? Where would they be based in Ukraine? And what role would they perform?
Stories are around that some countries – the British and French in one version, the British, Germans and Poles in another (unlikely option) – would actually put boots on the ground in Ukraine, although British sources insist that its troops would not be on the front line but “far back” from the action.
President Donald Trump says that the US won’t send any troops, but will support a security guarantee for Ukraine with US aircraft, presumably mainly spy aircraft (which, anyway, the US is regularly doing). But Trump has also touted US air superiority against Russia, suggesting that the US air patrols might well include fighter aircraft such as the F-35. Would these aircraft operate from Ukrainian soil or from bases in Poland and Romania, for example?
The virtual meeting included the defense chiefs from all 32 NATO member countries. The meeting was overseen by Italian Admiral Giuseppe Cavo Dragone, the chair of NATO’s Military Committee.
The new Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR) and leader of the US European Command, US General Alexus Grynkewich, delivered his first briefing to the virtual meeting. Also attending was General Dan Caine, who is chairman of the US Joint Chiefs of Staff.
Russia’s reaction came quickly and rejected foreign participation in security guarantees for Ukraine. Speaking about the possibility of foreign troops being deployed on Ukrainian territory, Russian foreign minister Sergey Lavrov said that Moscow has always viewed this as unacceptable. “And I hope they understand that this would be absolutely unacceptable for Russia and for all sensible political forces in Europe,” Lavrov said.” He went on to say that such proposals are a “road to nowhere.”
It is hard to be sure what led the Trump administration to believe that the Russians would accept NATO states providing security for Ukraine. The very high level of US participation under the NATO banner creates a significant roadblock to a deal on Ukraine.
There also is emerging pushback on any peace deal that involves Ukraine surrendering all or part of Donbas. In a story on August 21st, the conservative Washington Times in a front-page story (print edition) suggested any deal was dangerous. “The ugly truth behind any deal that would cede a chunk of Ukraine’s Donbas region to Moscow is that it could immediately strengthen the Russian military, providing a major win for one of America’s leading adversaries in an era of great power competition.
“In such a scenario, Ukraine would lose some of its most heavily fortified defensive positions. Russian President Vladimir Putin’s generals would seek to deepen their substantial footprint in the strategically vital theater with new military bases. The Russian navy could gain even greater control over the Black Sea. The Russian government and its armed forces could take de facto ownership of the significant mineral deposits underground in eastern Ukraine.”
The Washington Times story goes on to quote a number of think tanks including the Institute for the Study of War, which has been strongly pro-Ukraine for some time.
While the diplomatic process continues, problems are mounting for Trump’s peace initiative for Ukraine.
Stephen Bryen is a special correspondent to Asia Times and former US deputy undersecretary of defense for policy. This article, which originally appeared in his Substack newsletter Weapons and Strategy, is republished with permission.
