The recent violence in Sweida province mark an alarming turning point in the Syrian conflict. This is not only due to the fact that state actors, represented by the General Security forces and the military, have abandoned any pretence of neutrality and actively participated in attacks alongside tribal non-state armed groups within the province, but also because the violence has been accompanied by sectarian mobilisation and a hate campaign.
This has largely targeted the Druze community, which has been in a precarious position since the Syrian state, now dominated by figures affiliated with Hayat Tahrir al-Sham, assumed power in December.
Their vulnerability is compounded by the growing geopolitical ambitions of the regional colonial power – Israel – at a critical historical moment shaped by the right-wing Trump administration in the United States, and a fragmented European foreign policy in the region.
The trigger for the recent events in Sweida was an incident on 12 July, when a Druze merchant was tortured, robbed and subjected to sectarian insults at a checkpoint on the road between Damascus and Sweida, controlled by a non-state armed group affiliated with Bedouin tribes from the south.
In response, a local Druze group kidnapped a member of the tribe, prompting the tribe to retaliate by abducting several individuals from the Druze community. But the roots of this conflict run deeper.
New MEE newsletter: Jerusalem Dispatch
Sign up to get the latest insights and analysis on
Israel-Palestine, alongside Turkey Unpacked and other MEE newsletters
According to journalist Mazen Ezzi, sectarian tensions and mobilisation against the Druze community began after the circulation of a fabricated video allegedly showing a Druze sheikh insulting the Prophet of Islam at the end of April.
As a result, non-state armed actors attacked Druze communities in the Damascus suburbs of Jaramana, Sahnaya and Ashrafiyat Sahnaya.
Asserting control
State authorities, specifically the General Security forces, used the unrest to intervene and assert control over areas that had previously remained under local control. The human toll included 130 civilians killed and hundreds displaced.
A similar scenario unfolded in Sweida. What began as a clash between two non-state armed groups quickly drew in the state, which intervened – ostensibly to de-escalate the violence, but in reality to seize the opportunity to assert control over the largely autonomous province by backing the Bedouin tribes.
The scale of violence – marked by the killing of entire families, including children; the shooting of unarmed civilians as they fled to neighbouring villages; and the destruction of Druze religious symbols, including images of Sultan Basha al-Atrash, a national hero – is unjustifiable.
As Ahmad, a survivor, recalled: “They burned my parents’ home before their eyes, set fire to the olive trees and destroyed my house.” He fled along with 80,000 others towards the Jordanian border. Ahmad confirmed that the military first used rocket launchers to destroy the villages before ground troops entered.
The massacre appears to be part of a broader state strategy aimed at silencing dissent and suppressing resistance to the highly centralised rule emanating from Damascus
According to the Syrian Observatory for Human Rights, the number of victims killed in Sweida now exceeds 1,600, with more than 420 executions and 176,000 displaced. The siege, marked by electricity and internet blackouts and the closure of roads for weeks on end, has led to the collapse of the health sector, leaving many of the wounded without access to treatment.
The massacre, widespread destruction and targeting of hospitals, and the siege itself, can be seen as a form of collective punishment for Sweida’s resistance to Damascus’s control, echoing the brutal tactics used by former President Bashar al-Assad’s forces in Aleppo, Eastern Ghouta and Yarmouk camp during the Syrian war. All involved in such violations must be held accountable under international law.
Despite efforts by regime-aligned media, supported by US officials, to portray the brutal killings of civilians and the destructive actions of military personnel as isolated incidents, the massacre appears to be part of a broader state strategy aimed at silencing dissent and suppressing resistance to the highly centralised – and increasingly personalised – rule emanating from Damascus.
It also seems to reflect a sectarian state policy of disregarding violence against communities whose values and culture differ from those of the leadership in Damascus.
This past March, sectarian-driven massacres were carried out against communities in Syria’s coastal regions, fuelled by collective prejudice and accusations of affiliations with Assad loyalists. Around 1,500 people were killed, and numerous violations were documented. Despite the formation of an investigative committee and the completion of a final report, no accountability measures have been taken, and no trials have been held.
Similarly, the refusal of the government to recognise the victims of a church bombing in Damascus as martyrs implied that Christian victims are not worthy of this official honour.
Societal divisions
Under the current policy, societal divisions in Syria have reached unprecedented levels. Sectarianism has historically functioned as a mechanism for social fragmentation and the consolidation of power, a pattern evident from the Ottoman era throughout the period of French colonial rule and into the Assad regime.
Over the past 14 years of conflict, sectarian narratives have been strategically instrumentalised by the Assad government and other actors to mobilise constituencies and secure political loyalty. Yet, even within this long trajectory of manipulation, the present moment marks an especially alarming escalation.
Authorities in Damascus are increasingly relying on violence and coercion to consolidate territorial control, prioritising these over service provision and legitimacy-building. Atrocities and demographic intimidation are being used as tools of domination, rather than the government investing in dialogue, trust or the reconstruction of a national identity after more than 14 years of war.
Official rhetoric about inclusion sharply contradicts authoritarian realities. The regime’s failures to protect civilians, improve living conditions or propose a participatory economic model have only deepened mistrust and led to the central government’s credibility being questioned.
Since March, President Ahmed al-Sharaa has concentrated power in unprecedented ways, holding multiple key posts, including president, quasi-prime minister and head of both the sovereign and development funds.
This power grab is unfolding without a functioning parliament, now expected to include 30 percent of members directly appointed by the president. At all levels, from governors to union leaders, appointments are made by Sharaa’s inner circle, echoing the exclusionary practices of the Assad era. Genuine participation and bottom-up governance are absent.
Meanwhile, public services collapse and socioeconomic conditions deteriorate. More than 90 percent of Syrians are living in poverty or dependent on aid, as education and healthcare systems fall apart. After more than eight months as leader, Sharaa has yet to present a roadmap to address poverty or social injustice. The new regime focuses on geopolitical bargaining and attracting foreign investment by selling off public assets, at the cost of the local economy.
Syria today is a fragmented and weakened country, and a fierce competition is unfolding over the vacuum left after the fall of Assad, whose key allies were Russia and Iran. Israel, in particular, is seeking to exploit this new reality to expand its security perimeter, reframe the occupied Golan Heights as official Israeli territory and potentially annex more Syrian land.
The growing tensions between the Druze community and the Sharaa government present a historical opportunity for Israel to push for more “comfortable” borders on Syrian soil.
Israel is leveraging a segment of the Druze population – specifically, those living inside Israel who identify as Israeli and are loyal to the Netanyahu government. This stands in contrast to the Druze residents of the Golan Heights, who continue to see themselves as Syrian and view Israel not as a protecting power, but as an occupying force.
Renewed clashes
The dire socioeconomic conditions faced by ordinary Syrians – those outside the networks of warlords, clientelist circles and the new business-military elite in Damascus – are driving many to seek any possible source of income. Recognising these urgent needs and the political exclusion of Sweida, Israel has sought to attract members of the Syrian Druze community by offering job opportunities.
The narrative of “protecting the Druze” provides Israel with a strategic opportunity – not only to intervene militarily, but also to gain acceptance among fearful and frustrated communities.
Although Turkey, Saudi Arabia, the UAE and Qatar are seeking greater influence in post-Assad Syria, and remain in competition with Israel, they are well aware of Israel’s ambitions and have been directly involved in Syrian-Israeli negotiations.
Syria after Assad: How Israel and the US are accelerating plans to partition the country
Read More »
In this context, a ceasefire agreement mediated between Syria and Israel by the US, Turkey and several Arab countries on 19 July aimed to end the conflict. But it ultimately failed, as renewed clashes with local forces from Sweida and Israeli air strikes on Syria soon followed.
On 24 July, the US brokered another agreement that expanded the roles of both the US and Israel in Syria, with the US assuming responsibility for the “Sweida file” and designating the southern provinces of Quneitra and Daraa as demilitarised zones with greater autonomy for local actors.
While serving Israeli geopolitical interests, the agreement undermines Syrian unity and state integrity, potentially redrawing colonial-era borders and reshaping the region’s post-colonial order.
Today, Sweida remains under siege by the Syrian state, which is simultaneously negotiating with Israel on a “humanitarian corridor” connecting Israel to Sweida – potentially paving the way for an agreed increase in the Israeli presence in southern Syria. The Druze community is thus stuck between two evils: a brutal state that murders and besieges them, and “protection” by a far-right Israeli government whose military has a documented record of crimes against humanity.
The views expressed in this article belong to the author and do not necessarily reflect the editorial policy of Middle East Eye.
